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CONSUMER LAW
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
VIOLATIONS OF THE FTC ACT AS VIOLATIONS OF THE LOUISIANA
UNFAIR. TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
It has been repeatedly recognized by Louisiana decisions that the
Louisiana legislature patterned Louisiana Revised Statutes Title 51 section
1405(A) closely on the language of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.' Therefore, it is apparent that the legislature intended
Louisiana courts to consider interpretations of section 5 by federal courts
and by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to determine the scope
and application of Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1405(A) so as to de-
termine whether the Louisiana law has been violated. 2 In Moore v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,' for example, the Louisiana Second Circuit
Court of Appeal looked to Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry &
Hutchinson . Co., 4 and Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,5 to
determine whether a certain creditor's acts and practices were "unfair"
within the meaning of section 1405(A). Thus, if the FTC considers a
practice to be "unfair" when it "offends established public policy and
when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or
substantially injurious to consumers," and if Spiegel's practice of filing
collection suits against its mail order customers in an inconvenient forum
is held violative of that FTC standard, then it should follow that the
act of Goodyear in entering its customer's home and repossessing prop-
erty sold to him on credit, without the customer's consent or knowledge,
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1987). Section 45(a)(1) states that "unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." La. R.S. 51:1405(A) substitutes the language
"in the conduct of any trade or commerce" for the federal language "in or affecting
commerce," but is otherwise identical to the federal language.
2. Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 102 S. Ct. 119 (1981); Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So.
2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Moore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 364 So. 2d
630 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978); Guste v. Demars, 330 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
See generally Standard Oil Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So. 2d 268
(1946); Moresi v. Burleigh, 170 La. 270, 127 So. 624 (1930); State v. Baddock, 170 So.
2d 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ denied, 170 So. 2d 867 (1965).
3. 364 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
4. 405 U.S. 233, 92 S. Ct. 898 (1972).
5. 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
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is likewise a violation of section 1405(A) of Title 51 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes. 6
The FTC has statutory power to prescribe "rules which define with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. section 45(a)(1). 7 From this
congressional grant of power has come, inter alia, the FTC's Preservation
of Consumers' Claims and Defenses Rule,8 by which it is an unfair or
deceptive act or practice under 15 U.S.C. section 45(a)(1) for a seller
to utilize a consumer credit contract which does not contain a prescribed
provision, 9 destructive of negotiable form, -and hence, destructive of
holder in due course status.' 0 The FTC has also used its power to
prescribe the Credit Practices Rule, 1 by which it is an unfair act or
practice under 15 U.S.C. section 45(a)(1) for a lender or retail installment
seller to take, in a consumer credit transaction, a nonpossessory security
interest in a consumer's household goods, other than a purchase money
6. So held in Moore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 364 So. 2d 630 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1978).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(l)(B) (Supp. 1987).
8. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1987).
9. The provision states as follows:
Notice
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services
obtained pursuant hereto or with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by
the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.
16 C.F.R. § 433 (1987). A similar provision must be placed in consumer credit contracts
made in connection with a purchase money loan by a lender "affiliated with" the seller
or to whom the seller refers consumers for such loans; unless the provision is placed in
such purchase money loan contracts (by the lender), the seller's acceptance of the loan
proceeds is violative of the rule.
10. The prescribed provision conditions the consumer's promise to pay within the
meaning of La. R.S. 10:3-104(1)(b) (1983). See Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 48
Md. App. 617, 429 A.2d 277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). Lacking negotiable form, the
possessor of the contract cannot be the holder and therefore not a holder in due course
of it, so as to cut off the consumer's claims or defenses under La. R.S. 10:3-305 (1983).
This result is obtained because only a "holder" may be a holder in due course under
La. R.S. 10:3-302(1) (1983), and only through the process of "negotiation" can a party
subsequent to the payee be a holder, under La. R.S. 10:3-202(1) (1983); but only a writing
in negotiable form may be "negotiated," and both sections 3-202(1) and 3-302(1) use the
word "instrument," which La. R.S. 10:3-102(l)(e) (1983) defines to mean a negotiable
instrument.
Even if one could argue that the FTC rule does not destroy the negotiable form of
an otherwise negotiable consumer credit contract, the holder of it would find it difficult
to qualify for holder in due course status under La. R.S. 10:3-302 (1983) in the face of
the FTC provision. See Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. v. Stamatiou, 384 So. 2d 388 (La.
1980); Hersbergen, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Banking Law, 41 La. L. Rev.
313-319 (1981).
11. 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1987).
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security interest.1 2 Thus, a violation of such an FTC rule is a violation
of 15 U.S.C. section 45(a)(1), whether the failure to heed the rule was
intentional or unintentional 3 and whether or not the failure actually
deceived anyone, so long as the act or practice had the tendency or
capacity to deceive.'
4
Logically, a violation of an FTC Trade Regulation rule should be
viewed as a presumptive violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes
51:1405(A); 5 however, the recent decision of the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal in LeBlanc v. Belt Center, Inc.,' 6 does not so hold.
At issue in Belt Center was whethera failure to comply with the FTC's
Franchising Disclosure Rule 7 was per se violative of 51:1405(A). The
first circuit held that the failure of compliance with the Rule's require-
ments was not an unfair trade practice under Louisiana Revised Statutes
51:1405(A), there being no showing of fraud, misrepresentation, decep-
12. The Rule defines the key terms "lender," "retail installment seller," and "house-
hold goods."
13. Proof of intention to deceive is not a requisite to a finding of a violation of 15
U.S.C. section 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1987). See, e.g., Beneficial Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983, 96 S. Ct. 1679 (1976); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963). Indeed, the FTC, the federal
courts, and a number of state courts have ruled that a failure to disclose pertinent
information may be as deceptive an act as an affirmative misrepresentation, and that it
is often necessary for a seller to disclose unfavorable facts to avoid misleading purchasers.
See, e.g., Simeon Management Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir.
1978); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Co., 376 Mass. 621, 382 N.E.2d 1065 (1978).
14. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 54 S. Ct. 315
(1934); Beneficial Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 983, 96 S. Ct. 1679 (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682, 61 S. Ct. 550 (1941). Section
45(b) does require a showing of public interest in an FTC proceeding. See Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Standard Oil of Calif., 449 U.S. 232, 101 S. Ct. 488 (1980); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 50 S. Ct. 1 (1929); Exposition Press, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 916, 82 S. Ct. 1554
(1962).
15. In addition to the rule of statutory construction applicable to "borrowed" statutes
referred to in the cases cited at note 2, supra, the language of La. R.S. 51:1406(4) (1987),
"[a]ny conduct which complies with section 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
[15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(), (Supp. 1987)], as from time to time amended, any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder. and any finally adjudicated court decision interpreting the pro-
visions of said Act, rules and regulations [are exempt from La. R.S. 51:1405(A) (1987)1,"
is, by negative implication, supportive of the proposition.
16. 509 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
17. The FTC Rule in question is entitled "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures." 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1987).
1
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tion, or unethical conduct. 8 The Belt Center decision is not only at
odds with the rule of statutory construction aforementioned, 9 it also
engrafts elements of proof nowhere found in section 1405(A). Moreover,
given the difficulty of proving fraud, and given that there is no private
right of action under the FTC Act,20 the decision is a virtual invitation
for overreaching by franchisors, and by sellers and lenders operating
under Trade Regulation rules as to consumers" claims and defenses, 2'
door-to-door selling, 2 credit practices 23 and used car sales. 24
A franchise agreement does not involve a consumer in the sense of
one who undertakes an obligation primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes; rather, the franchisee has a profit motive.2 5 The
FTC, however, has documented the similarities between franchisees and
18. 509 So. 2d at 137. Cf. Martin v. International Dryer Corp., 637 F. Supp. 101
(E.D.N.C. 1986) (a violation of a disclosure rule of the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission did not establish per se that the product in question presented an unreasonable
or substantial risk of harm). Ironically, a showing of fraud in the Belt Center case would
not have been impossible. The case of Westbury Small Business Corp. v. Ballarine, 125
A.D.2d 462, 509 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), affirmed a finding of franchisor
fraud premised on a knowing failure to disclose material facts.
19. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5 and 15. The court's decision is at odds
with the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Morgan v. Air Brook Limousine,
Inc., 211 N.J. 101, 510 A.2d 1197 (1986), which reached the conclusion that a failure
of compliance with the Franchising Disclosure rule was a per se violation of the New
Jersey consumer fraud law:
The Rule establishes basic minimum standards for lawful business conduct in
the sale, offer for sale and advertising of franchises or business opportunity
ventures. It is designed to prevent deception or unfairness in such transactions
by prohibiting certain conduct and by imposing affirmative obligations upon
those who engage in such transactions. The Rule is a recognition that such
transactions often involve consumer commitment of substantial dollars in an
attempt to secure self-reliance and security in an independent business, often
without the availability of reliable, meaningful and adequate information to
make an informed investment decision. Without such information, the consumer's
attempt to share in the "American Dream" could result in a nightmare of
significant personal and financial proportions.
510 A.2d at 1205. See also Bailey Employment Sys. v. Hahn, 545 F. Supp. 62 (D. Conn.
1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1983) (the FTC rule specifically declares the failure
to disclose to be an unfair or deceptive act or practice, and no proof of reliance, or of
intent to deceive is required; a violation of the state's unfair trade practices act may arise
from a failure to disclose material information).
20. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971), 485 F.2d
986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1987).
22. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1987).
23. 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1987).
24. 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1987).
25. Under the Louisiana deceptive practices provisions, the protection of section
1405(A) is not limited to those "consumers" who have a non-profit motivation. See La.
R.S. 51:1402(1) (1987).
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consumers in its Statement of Basis and Purpose for the Franchising
Disclosure Rule.2 6 At best, the Belt Center decision only imposes a
26. In its investigation the FTC reported:
It is the nature and context of this setting which has permitted the abuses
detailed below to flourish. Specifically, it is apparent from the record that a
serious informational imbalance exists between prospective franchisees and their
franchisors. This imbalance has been shown to exist, "even with the best
intentions for fair treatment" of franchisees by franchisors. As noted by Pro-
fessor Urban Ozanne, in a statement presented to the commission on the first
proposed rule:
"The prospective franchisee does not approach the contract negotiations with
the franchisor as an equal. The usual tremendous economic disparity between
the parties to the franchise agreement is obvious. Moreover, a severe infor-
mational disparity exists as well. First, the franchisor or his franchise salesman
sets before the franchisee a franchise agreement that is long and complicated.
The franchisee or his attorney is seldom in a position to fully evaluate this
document or its implications. Second, the franchisor has substantial experience
in negotiating with franchisees, while this may be the franchisee's one and only
contract negotiation. Third, the franchisor presents the information about the
franchise and its sales and profits. Unlike the franchisee, he knows how much
of the information is fact and how much puffery..."
The impact of this "informational imbalance" is particularly acute in franchising
where many prospective franchisees possess a low level of business sophistication.
The relative lack of business sophistication is demonstrated by numerous material
and comments on the public record. For example, in The Economic Effects of
Franchising-a detailed study of "fast food" franchising undertaken by Pro-
fessors Ozanne and Hunt-it was reported that "... 68% of our sample of
franchisees did not own a business prior to their franchised business and half
the franchisees had incomes below $10,000 prior to buying their franchise."
This relative lack of business experience and low capitalization is quite striking
in light of the nature of franchising-a "highly complex, dynamic and changing
area, with varied sophisticated business, financial and legal techniques and
complications." Given the complex nature of most franchising operations, it is
somewhat surprising that a group of relatively "unsophisticated" persons enter
a field which requires such a significant degree of business acumen. One of the
reasons accounting for the involvement of such persons in franchising is the
"get rich quick" claims utilized by many franchisors in advertisements and other
promotional materials. As indicated by numerous franchisee complaints, such
claims often induce a person who has had little or no formal business training
into believing that he or she may earn a great deal of money with little effort
and in spite of a lack of experience. As further illustrated by such complaints
and related public record materials, such "get rich quick" claims frequently
either are unsubstantiated by the franchisor, or they misrepresent material facts
with regard to the "potential earnings" of a particular franchise business...
In this regard, the susceptible nature of prospective franchisees to such claims
of "instant success" created the potential for serious economic injury as a result
of concealment or misrepresentation of the material terms of the franchise
business under consideration.
Statement of Basis and Purpose Relating to Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, CCH Business Franchise Guide
para. 6304.
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difficult burden of proof on franchisees and consumers in cases involving
violations of FTC Trade Regulation rules; at worst, the decision imposes
an across-the-board requirement that private litigants under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 51:1405(A) prove fraud, scienter, reliance (and therefore
deception) or unethical conduct-none of which are statutorily required.
In Pizzaloto v. Hoover Co.,27 by contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal of Louisiana, citing favorably Hinchliffe v. American Motors
Corp. ,28 a decision under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,
has recognized what the Belt Center decision does not: that state unfair
trade practices acts have been adopted so as to eliminate the difficult
proof problems in fraud cases-the plaintiff in an unfair trade practices
act need not prove misrepresentation or other fraudulent conduct, nor
reliance thereon, nor that the representation or suppression of the truth
became part of the basis of the bargain. Indeed, the judicial-legislation
of such requisites has the effect of blue-penciling the word "unfair"
from Louisiana Revised Statutes 51:1405(A) for, given that any deceptive
act or practice is inherently unfair, the use of the word "unfair" in
section 1405(A) must have been intended to mean something beyond
"deception." If one accepts the correctness of the Moore v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber/FTC definition of unfair,2 9 a requirement of proof of
intent by the defendant emasculates the remedy of the Louisiana De-
ceptive Practices Act.
27. 486 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied 488 So. 2d 202 (1986).
28. 184 Conn. 1216, 440 A.2d 810 (1981). See also Urling v. Helms Exterminators,
Inc., 468 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Cf. D.D.D. Corp. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942) (holding that the FTC'Act itself does not require
that a violation of the act rise to the level of fraud).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
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